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vChairman’s Introduction
Vice‑Chancellor, Professor Helen Vendler, and Fellow‑Students: it is 
a pleasure indeed to be here as Chairperson of the fifth Hilda Hulme Lecture. 
Hilda Hulme was a distinguished teacher and scholar of this university and I 
had the very great privilege of being taught Anglo‑Saxon, Anglo‑Saxon poetry 
is what I most strongly remember, by her. Hilda was quite a severe teacher 
of language but she never forgot, when teaching ‘The Dream of the Rood’ or 
‘The Fall of the Angels’, that she was teaching poetry. The lecture tonight is on 
Shakespeare, one of three fields in which Dr. Hulme was distinguished, the 
others being the language of Elizabethan drama, and Victorian fiction. Her 
work on Shakespeare was remarkable for its close scrutiny of words, texts, and 
contexts. She was learned not only in drama but in non‑literary records, which 
she studied with zeal. I remember her also as a friend, wonderfully pugnacious, 
marvellous to argue and quarrel with.
Helen Vendler is also a friend. I can remember – I don’t know whether she 
does – at least two arguments we had at the Yeats School in Sligo. One was on 
a subject which is inflammatory, though I think we both kept our heads – the 
representation of women in Yeats’s poetry, and the other was about puns. On 
several occasions I certainly argued with Hilda Hulme – usually coming off 
worse – about meanings of words, phrases, and sentences.
It’s a particularly appropriate choice, and wonderful to have Helen Vendler 
with us tonight. She is the A. Kingsley Porter University Professor at Harvard, 
and a distinguished critic and reviewer of poetry. She reviews for the New 
Yorker, and brings together the liveliness of the best kind of reviewing with 
impeccable scholarship. What I admire in her work would take too long to 
explain and illustrate, so I will just say, very briefly that she is a critic with 
an individual voice. It’s a dangerous thing now to say this about a critic, but 
insofar as we may be allowed to speak and write with individual voices, she has 
one. She shows in all her work something which is most valuable, intellectual 
and emotional continuity. She also has – and needs this to be a great reviewer 
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– the courage and confidence to be a judge. I invite her now to talk to us on the 
subject of Shakespeare’s sonnets, to show us ‘Ways into Shakespeare’s Sonnets’: 
Professor Helen Vendler.
1Ways into Shakespeare’s Sonnets
I am honoured to have been asked to give this lecture in memory of 
Hilda Hulme, whose bold investigative work into Shakespeare’s language 
has illuminated Shakespeare’s mind for many readers, proving the benefits 
conferred on us by those trained in historical linguistics.
I should mention too – since my topic is Shakespeare’s sonnets – the debt I 
owe to the work of Winifred Nowottny, whose essays on the sonnets are of such 
permanent value.
We can see in the criticism of Shakespeare’s sonnets the tendency of the 
criticism of poetry to fall into two camps. On the one hand, there are the 
thematic critics, with whom, in the case of the sonnets, I group genre‑ critics 
(who tend, in this case, to define genres thematically, as poetry of love, or 
friendship, or praise). The concerns of thematic or content‑ oriented studies of 
the sonnets have varied over time: there were the 1640 attempts at psychological 
titles which would unambiguously state the occasion or matter of the sonnet; 
there were biographical and historical tetherings of the themes; later, there 
were attempts to make a more coherent thematic order in the sequence; 
and there were comparative studies of Shakespeare’s themes against those of 
Petrarch or Ronsard, or of the themes of the sonnets against those of the plays. 
A generation ago, psychological themes began to dominate, supplementing the 
long history of ethical commentary on the sonnets.
On the other hand, though they are far fewer in number, there have 
been form‑critics, interested either in the sonnet form or in the rhetoric of 
Shakespeare as sonneteer. Their work has tended to confine itself chiefly to 
one or the other aspect of form: Giorgio Melchiori interested himself in the 
dramatic patterning of the impersonal sonnets, creating visual diagrams that 
are really graphic representations of wordplay; Rosalie Colie called attention 
to the way Shakespeare’s sonnets include the sharpness of epigram as well as 
the sweetness of the sonnet form; Caroline Spurgeon was followed by others 
interested in Shakespeare’s imagery, and William Empson’s inventiveness, we 
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may say, in finding examples of ambiguity has been carried to its extreme by 
Stephen Booth. Among linguistically trained critics, the most successful writer 
on the sonnets has been Winifred Nowottny, whose work has the great virtue 
of keeping literary considerations in view; but Roman Jakobson himself could 
not resist applying his binary analysis to Shakespeare, with unhappy results. 
Most recently, Brian Vickers has applied his interest in the figures and schemes 
of classical rhetoric to the sonnets. These form‑critics, in one way or another, 
isolate one question for investigation, as I have said; and though they may pay 
lip service to other concerns, it is for their single overriding interest that they 
are remembered.
Between the thematic critics and the formal critics, there is a middle ground 
of criticism of the Sonnets that has been left relatively unoccupied (the notable 
exceptions are Blackmur and Nowottny), and that I want to take up here. I 
would call it the aesthetic dynamics of the sonnets. The Shakespearean sonnet 
is a fluent form modified in each of its active appearances. Each instance of 
the form is an instance of an aesthetic problem solved: how will the form 
take on new life? Almost all potential aspects of the form thus appear in the 
group of sonnets composed by Shakespeare over time; and to me, this is the 
most satisfying way to see these poems: as a series of individual poems, small 
sequences, and perhaps two large sequences, in which several forms native to 
lyric in general and the Shakespearean sonnet in particular exhibit over and 
over their aesthetic potential.
I take my base, then, the forms – generic, rhetorical, expressive, linguistic, 
and prosodic – which seem to me to underlie, and create the dynamics, of a 
given sonnet: these forms account for its individual exfoliation and motivate its 
structure. I here conceive of structure as the solution to an aesthetic problem‑
the problem of how to unpack a form or forms in a representationally accurate 
and aesthetically satisfying way. I place representational invention and 
aesthetic conclusiveness, rather than, say, propositional meaning or rhetorical 
figuration (which are natural to all language and not simply to poetry or 
aesthetically motivated language) as the poet’s aim. The chief point, for the 
artist, about the theme is that it should be one susceptible to formal variation 
and development (not all notions are equally rich in themselves or in their 
cultural potential). Shakespeare (it is no news to say so) excels his continental 
and English predecessors in both depth and fertility of dynamic invention. 
To speak about this aesthetic fertility and what it accomplishes in the way 
of ascribed emotional or intellectual depth in verse means that one cannot 
remain, in discussing a sonnet, at the level of occasional ornament (logical or 
linguistic) alone, but must enter into the constitutive problem‑solving labour of 
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the artist, realizing the constant fluidity of his enterprise. From the conception 
of the problem he puts to himself, we can reasonably speak of the cooperation 
and resistance of the elements of the poem in their aesthetic function. These 
means cannot be thought of as isolated from each other, atomistic ornamental 
sparks of language, but must be conceived of as a self‑constructing, self‑
exhausting dynamic system. An inert criticism is content to rest in a linear 
model, rehearsing the events or statements of a poem without asking for the 
motivating forces behind the changes the poem displays in genre, rhetoric, 
figuration, syntax, or prosodic form; it is preferable, 1 think, to see these 
sonnets as active around centres of aesthetic concern, centres generating their 
linear changes.
We all, I think, believe in the existence of superior and inferior readings, while 
recognizing that since readings arise from different centres of concern they can 
never entirely overlap. I have been troubled by the flatness, in aesthetic quality, 
of readings of the sonnets. In such readings, the sonnets are chiefly seen as 
reiterative structures, in which the first quatrain stands as thesis for several 
following quatrains and a summary couplet; or as structures of simple contrast 
of octave and sestet, where eight mutually reiterative lines are followed by four 
or six contrastive lines, lines enunciating a propositional opposition to the 
proposition of the first set. Since the themes which are reiterated or contrasted 
are familiar ones (‘Time will come and take my love away’; ‘Love is not love 
which alters when it alteration finds’; ‘I have sworn thee fair and thought 
thee bright / That art as black as hell, as dark as night’), it is hard to make 
much of them critically. Interest in the narrative of the sonnets (a very thin 
narrative) has also been hard to elaborate in a critical way. The most ingenious 
criticism of the sonnets has been done by linguists, historical rhetoricians, and 
semioticians, but their emphasis on the mere presence of tropes, the presence 
of puns, the presence of ambiguities, the presence of phonic complexity, has 
worked to obliterate the functional dynamics of the characteristics they isolate.
All of these lines of criticism‑thematic, linguistic, rhetorical‑guide their 
readings along axes of similarity. They say, respectively, ‘Here are many X’‑
where X can be ‘alliterative words,’ ‘uses of synecdoche,’ ‘remarks about time,’ or 
‘puns on ‘Will.’ This fashion of synthetic reading groups members of a sonnet‑
its words, its lines, its figures, its sounds – into syntheses of resemblances. I 
believe it thereby flattens out the aesthetic dynamics of the poems, seeing the 
sonnets generating themselves by repetition and reiteration rather than by 
self‑contradiction and difference. Any two quatrains of a Shakespeare sonnet 
will tend to exhibit resemblances, it is true; but those two quatrains will also 
exhibit differences from each other. If our powerful will‑to‑assimilation has so 
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far caused us to notice mainly the similarities, I think it is time that we began 
to scrutinize the differences. And, once we notice the differences, we have to 
formulate a hypothesis explaining the swerve away, on the part of the second 
quatrain, from the system enunciated by the first quatrain.
I want to propose here two chief models of aesthetic construction of 
difference. In the first, subsequent quatrains are perceptibly different from 
earlier ones (which they may also distinctly resemble). The incremental pieces 
of a sonnet, roughly speaking, re‑do their predecessors; we are to consider 
earlier moments as repudiated and corrected by later ones. The change of mind 
involved is irreversible; one cannot go backwards. I will use for my example of 
this self‑correcting aesthetic form both ‘Th’ expense of spirit’ and ‘That time 
of year.’
And the second model I want to propose is the model of re‑inscription. In a 
re‑inscription, words which have appeared earlier in a sonnet reappear in a later 
portion: a second ‘identical’ text is inscribed over the first, on the same ground, 
deepening the first, making it more legible. The second use of the same word or 
words elaborates, or inscribes more deeply, or brings out latent meaning in, the 
first use, making its significance, hitherto occluded, unmistakable. My text for 
this model is ‘Let me not to the marriage of true minds.’ Both of the structural 
models of difference I propose here are primarily temporal ones‑something is 
done over better, or done again deeper – but they are at the same time visual 
ones, in that one finds traces, in the later quatrain, of the first effort that has 
been the prompting of the second.
To reveal the ways in which the will‑to‑form which we presuppose in the 
artist distributes itself in the work of art is to reveal something more basic 
than to follow out a single critical preoccupation with, for instance, imagery 
or ambiguity. To make a hermeneutic postulate of the artist’s will‑to‑form 
enables us to see the poem as a representation, and temporary solution, of 
an aesthetic problem of representation which the writer has set himself. His 
various aesthetic resources (including generic opportunities, speech acts, 
ornament, imagery, syntax, focus of vision, and so on) can interact interestingly 
only because they are mustered in the service of an imaginative aim. To try 
out, in reading the sonnets, the intuition that each is an aesthetic problem of 
representation displayed, put in motion, and exhausted, is to grant them their 
most decisive power‑the power to convert an a priori aesthetic inquiry on the 
part of the writer into a satisfactory linguistic shape. I hope these principles of 
treatment will become evident as I look at particular sonnets.
My first example of self‑correction is Shakespeare’s sonnet on lust, and I 
will repeat briefly here an argument I made about it some years ago – that 
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the sonnet, though impersonally phrased, is best accounted for by seeing 
it as a representation of decisive changes of mind about the experience it 
treats, changes predicated of a single sensibility: that is, the text encourages 
us to invent such a sensibility and its changes of heart. But if we treat it, as 
I want to here, as a problem of construction for the artist, we see that the 
artist’s first choice must be whether to represent his psychological narrative of 
submission to lust passionally and chronologically, as it sequentially happened 
from excitement to shame and analysis, or analytically and retrospectively, 
as one looks back on that submission in later evaluation. Shakespeare at first 
rejects the chronological account – attraction, appetite, enjoyment, disgust, 
repentance, excuse, analysis – in favour of the more explosive possibilities of 
the retrospective vision – the awaking to shame, blame, and self‑reproach, in a 
judgemental, ‘morning‑after’ account of the experience.
Shakespeare chose as his aesthetic problem the representation of changing 
responses to lust, and decided to enact the changes by showing three different 
sorts of retrospection: personal‑judgemental, personal‑chronological, and 
universal‑analytic. He did this rather than demonstrate, about lust, solely a 
chronological memory, solely a judgemental self‑blame, solely an analytical 
totalisation, or any other possible model (for example, a rapid alteration from 
blame to excuse and back again, a binary model). Shakespeare also had the 
choice in this sonnet of using a first‑person model (his usual one for sonnets) 
but chose, unusually, to speak in an impersonal voice which, though it initially 
mimics a philosophical or homiletic tone, soon loses its initial defensive 
distance and becomes uncontrolled in its spate of adjectives of social trespass. 
By the third quatrain, any pretence of the homiletic has been discarded; a cleric 
might be conceived of as pronouncing the octave, but not what follows, which 
certifies lust as a ‘bliss in proof,’ ‘a dream,’ and a ‘heaven.’
Reading along an axis of similarity, as most critics have done, one can 
see similarity displayed in the persistence, throughout the sonnet, of the 
definitional syntactic matrix ‘Lust is X,’ which continues throughout the three 
quatrains, from ‘expense of spirit’ to ‘joy’ and ‘dream.’ Reading for difference, 
however, we note the contrasts among the definitions of lust, and therefore see 
the position of the poem as one that changes over time. The wish to define – 
represented by the syntax and by the master‑ trope of concatenation – does not 
change. The substance of the definition, however, does change – from disgusting 
act to dream. It is the axis of difference that drives us to postulate a change of 
heart; the axis of similarity (‘Lust is ... lust is ... lust is ...’) could belong to an 
impersonal treatise. I should add that Shakespeare also chooses in the sonnet 
an analytic rather than a descriptive model of definition; his is a mathematical 
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and materialist model of the mean and the extremes, of cause and effect, of 
before and after, of relations to self and to others. There are of course reasons 
that we can suggest for such aesthetic choices, as I will now suggest.
To choose a retrospective judgemental view with which to begin the sonnet is, 
as I have said, more dramatic than to choose a chronological reverie. However, 
chronological reverie eventually supplants the retrospective judgement 
(only to be supplanted inits turn by a totalising view encompassing both the 
chronological re‑enactment of the act and one’s retrospective judgement on 
it). Shakespeare may also have chosen the retrospective judgemental view as 
his beginning because it is the only angle of vision from which an analytic 
perspective becomes plausible. The speaker’s choice of definition and division 
into parts in the deceptively scholastic beginning (‘Th’ expense of spirit in a 
waste of shame / Is lust in action, and till action lust / is perjured,’ etc.) shows 
us the first defence of the speaker: to divide his unsettling topic into three 
apparently rational parts, to distinguish its phases along a temporal axis‑lust 
until action, lust in action, and lust after action. The ego has here a vested 
interest in distinguishing the present self‑in‑repentance from the former 
self‑in‑sin (the model representing the common conversion schema), and 
therefore it launches itself, after its putatively tripartite beginning (in which 
‘after action’ remains a ghost part) into its rigid binary antitheses of before 
and after, tending more and more to obliterate its initial postulated division 
into three. We soon move into the binary schemes of enjoyed and despised, 
hunted and hated (the latter retaining a semantic and prosodic overtone of 
the original tripartite scheme by including ‘had’ in its triplet of ‘hunted, had, 
hated,’ while the syntax reinforces the binary model, reinforced as well by the 
double repetition of ‘past reason’).
Of course both schemata – the ‘scholastic’ one of the tripartite division along 
a temporal axis, and the subsequent ‘repentant’ conversion scheme of binary 
form – disappear in the double knot where the poem is aesthetically knitted 
together, in which all divisions collapse and in which the original dramatic 
passion of self‑reproach is itself at last judged: lust has made ‘the takemad/ 
Mad in pursuit, and in possession [mad]-, lust is ‘had, having, and in quest to 
have, extreme.’ After this has been said, nothing can be the same. While the 
first adverse totalising judgement has been made on a psychological basis – 
the subject isnad before, during, and after taking the bait‑the second adverse 
totalising judgement – extreme – has been made on a geometric or classical base 
of means and extremes, rather than on the social or religious or psychological 
objections earlier displayed in the poem. Socially, lust is of course savage in its 
pursuit of its object, perjuring itself, untrustworthy, and so on; religiously, it may 
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be an expense of spirit on base matter; psychologically, it may be the occasion 
of shame and madness. But geometrically it is extreme, going past the mean of 
reason in all directions. I call this final totalising judgement geometric rather 
than ethical (though the norm is the norm of reason) because the vocabulary 
of purely ethical judgement includes words far less neutral than Shakespeare’s 
carefully chosen word ‘extreme.’ (He might have said ‘bestial,’ or ‘ungoverned,’ 
or ‘childish,’ for instance, and still remained within an ethical vocabulary.)
In running through the whole gamut of retrospective experience – from 
apparent detachment to violent self‑blame and blaming of the other (who 
laid the swallowed bait on purpose) – and knitting it up finally under the 
single rubric ‘extreme’ – the word itself remembered, or rather retrieved, 
as the only aesthetically productive word from the early adjectival torrent 
of self‑accusation‑the poem is able to set out, in little, what it is to have an 
extreme experience and to emerge from it full of self‑hatred and hatred of the 
temptress‑other.
Then the poem can move on to its moment of aesthetic difference‑to a 
different view of lust, representing itas it was felt at the time. It can move, in the 
couplet, to a totalising encompassing of its previous differentiations.
Let me explain. The word ‘extreme,’ knitting the three temporal phases 
together under a neutral rubric, enables the second part of the poem to reverse 
the retrospective model of the first part. The correction proper can now take 
place (though it has been in itself already a reconceiving to see the action of 
lust geometrically instead of homiletically or socially). The poem now sees the 
action of lust (11.11‑12) not from the perspective of an aftermath of shame, in 
an alienated fashion, but rather chronologically and affectively – how the action 
seemedwhile it was being lived. First it seemed like a joy, later it seemed unreal. 
This correction – as affective chronology corrects judgemental alienation from 
one’s own past, as bow it felt corrects what was done-is, roughly speaking, the 
major aesthetic choice of the writer. The poem gives us, in short, two absolutely 
incompatible and yet two absolutely reliable retrospective accounts of lust – 
the earlier alienated judgemental nominal and adjectival inventory (expense, 
waste, savage, extreme), and the late chronological nominal affective tale (bliss, 
woe, joy, dream). It thus presents us with two models of experience, both of 
which we know intimately: the model of ‘What I think of it now that I look 
back’ and the model of ‘How it felt while it was happening.’ Usually, in simpler 
poems, one of these models fires the other out. To keep both in suspension, 
as Shakespeare does here by his cyclical couplet thematizing the preceding 
two models, is to say that both are equally true. The poem corrects its first 
telling by a second one, but does not, unlike an overpainted painting, entirely 
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obliterate the first sketch. The couplet sums up the incompatibility between 
chronologically lived affective life – the heaven that leads to hell – and the 
retrospective analytical life – what the world well knows.
We see now the necessity of the authorial choice of the impersonal mode for 
the purposes of this sonnet. Any existential subject would have to represent 
himself at the moment of utterance – the ‘now’ of the poem – as living his 
retrospection either chronologically or judgementally, and this would privilege 
one point of view over the other. The impersonal mode allows for the habitual 
incompatibility and the perpetual sequentiality of both models. The couplet 
ironizes both models, ultimately, putting both their mutual incongruity and 
repetitive sequentiality in a larger cyclical totalisation in which one is only 
the obverse of the other, both existing in a mutual temporal dependency, 
represented formally by the chiastic ‘well knows’ and ‘knows well.’ (The poem 
also comes full circle in its deictic ‘this hell,’ indicating that the speaker is 
back where he started in line 1.) For all that, the major aesthetic move of the 
sonnet is to paint over our first impression – the shame and blame of lust – 
with a second, the joy and sorrow and unreality of lust; and then to paint over 
that with the ironizing and totalising third. Through the third layer of ironic 
knowledge we see still the two underpaintings‑the pentimenti – the first of a 
post‑erotic hell, the second of a brief erotic heaven. Thus, reading for difference 
provides for a far more interesting‑and I could say more ‘worthy’‑shape for 
this poem than the shape‑an unvaried condemnation of lust – offered, even by 
Shakespeare’s latest editors, by reading along the axis of similarity.
A superior aesthetic value is normally ascribed to the last stage of a 
painting exhibiting pentimento; and we do perhaps tend to ascribe a higher 
epistemological value to the most comprehensive account in a poem of the 
phases of experience that it treats. But we must recall that in aesthetic terms 
we ascribe final value not to any one set of lines, but rather to the entire 
sonnet. The aim of this sonnet has been to solve the problem of representing 
the various mental phases aesthetically deployed here: judgemental disgust, 
affective memory, and the ironic totalising of both. We value its success 
in each, and we admire as well the successive motivations by which each 
believably replaces its predecessor stage(s). We are drawn to notice the three 
models because the first careens into adjectives, the second reverts to nouns, 
and the third retreats into proverbial diction (among other differences). It is 
these grammatical and discursive differences that warn us that we must read 
along an axis of difference, if we are to understand the poem at all. An account 
of sonnet 129 that never asks why its initial contained scholastic and individual 
definition hurtles into a spate of adjectives of social trespass; or why the initial 
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static nouns and adjectives suddenly are displaced by past participles; or why 
the past participles are then displaced by a pointed return to four nouns (‘bliss,’ 
‘woe,’ ‘joy,’ ‘dream’) as much unlike the opening’s four nouns (‘expense,’ ‘spirit,’ 
‘waste,’ and ‘shame’) as possible;‑an account not following the conspicuous 
signals afforded by the poem concerning its own phases of difference will 
never see the functional aesthetic dynamic of the poem.
The most interesting example of self‑correction in the sonnets occurs in the 
famous ‘That time of year.’ Three ascribed perceptions, self‑descriptions on the 
poet’s part postulated as being felt by the young man, make up the quatrains; 
these have usually been seen, because readers read along an axis of similarity, 
simply as variations on the single theme of age. (Ascribed sentiments are in 
themselves an interesting fictional problem in the sonnets. But here I am 
concerned with the poet’s successive invention of figures for his condition and 
how we, together with the supposed youth, are to read them.) Everyone has 
noticed that the last figure – that of fire – does not follow logically from those 
of the season and the day. In general, however, an accommodated criticism 
has absorbed the likeness without balking very much at the difference. The 
reading generated by the powerful axis of similarity sees no important change 
occurring in the poem. And it is true that the figures are parallel insofar as 
the span of time spoken of shrinks as we pass from one figure to the next; 
but this undeniable parallelism has been used to mask an equally undeniable 
re‑thinking in the sonnet of what it means to come to the end of life. It is 
this reconceiving of the mortality of the person that I want to empathize as 
the aesthetic problem generating the sonnet. What figures, the artist asks, 
will serve to convey my successive changes of mind about mortality, and how 
must they be managed? He decides on three figures, the first two of which will 
become, by the decisive change of mind so central to the poem pentimenti, 
rejected sketches.
The figure dominating the opening of the sonnet is a contrastive one, in 
which almost every word is generated by difference. The leaves, once green, are 
now yellow; once many, are now few; the choirs, once populated and entire, are 
now ruined and bare; the present silence is defined by the absence of the sweet 
birds’ song. This sort of definition by difference is one produced by nostalgia; 
the backward glance to birdsong at the close of the quatrain is in fact the 
motivating force of the poem as it opens, and generates the small myth of the 
villain cold who bears responsibility for the ruin and the subsequent departure 
of the birds by making the boughs shake and lose their leaves. This figure reads 
the text of the aging body realistically, as one shaken by palsy, stripped bare, 
and deprived of voice.
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In the second figure, a ‘villain’ causing deprivation is still present in the form 
of black night who takes away the fading day. But the text of the aging body 
is read more emblematically than realistically in this second scanning: ‘black 
night’ is ‘Death’s second self.’ And this figure is less backward‑looking than the 
first; it glances back momentarily, but not to the dawn corresponding to spring, 
but rather to a fading sunset; and it has turned its glance willingly toward a 
future rest, a position impossible to the first figure.
At this point in the poem something changes radically. Shakespeare decides to 
abandon the diachronic or linear model representing the passage of time from 
‘before’ to ‘now’ to ‘later.’ He adopts instead‑in the most powerful change in the 
poem – a vertical or synchronic model of strata. By that change he reduces the 
two previous figures to pentimenti. In the new model, the ‘now’ and the future 
are visually superimposed on the ‘then.’ Youth is the underbed, the ashes of 
past embers; ‘now’ is the glowing embers; the future will be the ashes of those 
glowing embers. In this model, the present state of the protagonist‑previously 
called ‘ruin’ and ‘twilight’ by difference‑is named for the first time by continuity, 
and phrased in positive terms: ‘In me thou seest the glowing of such fire.’ This 
is to read the text of the aging self entirely on the level of the unseen – the aged 
countenance is read in its inner condition rather that by its exterior appearance, 
as in the first figure, or its emblematic value, as in the second. To call oneself 
a glowing is different from calling oneself a ruin or a twilight, and conclusively 
repudiates the earlier differential or contrastive conceptions. Here, the past is 
not remembered nostalgically as a place of sweet singing birds; rather, it is 
truthfully named as what it now is, ashes. The life‑spirit dwells not in the past 
with green foliage, nor in the future with a wished‑for ‘rest,’ but rather in the 
present – which, though it may be short, is still ‘glowing.’ The future is seen 
accurately as a deathbed, rather than as a rest. But there is no villain in this last 
‘reading.’ The ruining cold, the black night, have no counterpart in this third 
figure; Shakespeare has decided that no malign fate robs man of life. In the 
remarkable analytic re‑conceiving which closes the third quatrain, Shakespeare 
abandons both his earlier extreme sweetness of natural description, and his 
later satisfying drama of emblematic robbery, in favour of an epigrammatic 
law of life: everything that lives, he says, himself most of all, is ‘consumed with 
that which it was nourished by.’ The ego, in this last model, is not something 
that is changed linearly by circumstance, as a tree changes from full foliage 
to bare boughs under the malign influence of the cold; rather, it is something 
that is a self‑sustaining, self‑destroying process, something layered inevitably 
on itself. The fulcrum of Shakespeare’s analytic law is the central ‘that which’ – 
balanced on the one side by ‘consum’d with’ and on the other side by ‘nourish’d 
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by’ – as the syntax enacts (since both verbs participate in the ‘that which’) the 
inseparability of nourishment and consumption. This ultimate analytic model 
is logically incompatible with its descriptive and emblematic predecessors, 
in which an innocent and flourishing entity (a tree, a sunset) is sinisterly 
deprived of its beauty by an intrusive external force like cold or black night. 
The analytic mode represents textually the author’s preferring of meditation 
on the governing laws of life over simple self‑descriptions – whether those 
generated by analogy with material images or those generated by emblematic 
allegorizing, his now discarded pentimenti.
We can see here, more clearly I think than anywhere else in the sonnets, 
what is gained and lost in the technique of self‑correction. What is gained 
here is at once a sterner formulation (‘All things contain in their very vitality 
the seeds of their own destruction’) and a grateful relief (life can be properly 
called, even in its last phase, glowing –  not a ruin, not a fading‑and there is no 
external villain waiting to do us harm). What is lost is the first feeling‑pang 
of nostalgia, the pathos of self‑contemplation against a happier past. Because 
the reconceivings visible in literature leave, as I have said, the pentimenti, 
the previous less satisfactory sketches, on the page, we see very vividly the 
Shakespearean attempt to give a full description of nostalgic perceptual 
sentiment as well as his subsequent resolute gaze at the truth of the matter, 
analytically considered. What we see most of all as we gaze at the entire sonnet 
is Shakespeare’s wish (represented by the axis of similarity) to give full aesthetic 
value to all conceivings of existence; and his equal wish (represented by the 
axis of difference) to leave sentimental or incomplete models behind.
The ‘more strong’ love ascribed to the young man reading this text of the 
aged self follows, I think, from the final ‘glowing’ ascribed to the text. And the 
substitution of ‘leave’ for ‘lose’ in the last line follows not only from the poet’s 
with to elide his own death in order to emphasize his present ‘glowing,’ but also 
from the need to express in a pun what the analytic law had already expressed 
in a line. If things are ‘consumed with that which they are nourished by,’ then to 
love is to leave; ‘loving’ engenders ‘leaving’ almost as by the invention of a new 
verb, of which ‘loving, leaving, leafless,’ might be the conjugation.
There are innumerable instances of self‑correction in the sonnets. An 
active re‑evaluating of the initial premise often motivates the second or third 
quatrains of the Shakespearean sonnet; sometimes a last re‑conceiving, as in 
the closing couplet in the sonnet on lust, makes pentimenti of all preceding 
sketches. By and large, critics have read Shakespeare’s sonnets as expansions 
and variations on the initial premise, rather than as changes of mind about it; 
I think this is a mistake. Far more often – even while a syntactic or imagistic 
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similarity is maintained as an armature or ‘spine’ – the initial premise is put in 
doubt, and even destroyed. A Shakespearean sonnet is a fluid object; it is not 
for nothing that Shakespeare thought of it (as one of the self‑reflexive moments 
of the sonnets suggests) as ‘a liquid prisoner pent in walls of glass.’ The prosodic 
walls are fixed, but the contents are labile, even volatile.
I pass now to my second model which, like the first, is both spatial and 
temporal – that of the re‑inscription. Unlike self‑correction, the figure of 
re‑inscription, as I define it here, does not change its mind. However, in this 
procedure, Shakespeare finds it necessary to restate exactly the same word or 
words what has already been said in a hazier form. The fact that the second 
passage is a re‑inscription and not a new inscription or a contradictory 
inscription is proved (as in the case I am about to propose, the sonnet on the 
marriage of true minds) by the direct repetition of identical words. When 
we see the same thing said twice over in a single sonnet, not varying to other 
words but re‑employing the same words, we are justified, as I hope to show, 
in thinking of the second instance as a re‑inscription over the first, in an 
effort to bring out latent meaning obscured in the first transmission. We have 
already encountered one example of re‑inscription, in the reappearance, in 
the climactic position knitting up the whole experience of lust, of the word 
‘extreme’ – retrieved from its modest and relatively colourless position in the 
earlier line ‘Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to trust.’ In the cohort of colourful 
adjectives of social trespass, ‘extreme’ seems like a failure of imagination on 
the part of the speaker. Yet it lingers from line 4 to reappear triumphantly at 
the end of line 10 – ’Had, having, and in the quest to have, extreme’ – as the 
only aesthetically productive adjective, the single one by which the whole 
experience of lust can be objectively, not psychologically, characterized.
But my central instance of re‑inscription is that famous near‑impersonal 
sonnet on the marriage of true minds, which re‑inscribes in quatrain 3 two 
crucial words from quatrain 1, ‘alter’ and ‘bend.’ Sonnet 116 is usually read 
as a definition‑poem, defining true love. That is, most critics decide to see 
the poem (guided by its beginning) as an example of the genre of definition, 
and this initial genre‑decision generates their interpretation. Let me begin by 
saying that I read this poem as an example, not of definition, but of dramatic 
refutation or rebuttal. The aesthetic motivation governing it springs, (as I 
hope to show) from the fiction of an anterior utterance by another which the 
sonnet is concerned to repudiate. My interpretation – against the traditional 
impersonal interpretation, which I believe to be untrue, and not simply 
incomplete‑springs from reading along a line of difference; the quatrains differ 
powerfully from one another. Also, there are too many ‘no’s’ and ‘nor’s,’ ‘never’s’ 
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and ‘not’s’ in this poem – one ‘nor,’ two ‘no’s,’ two ‘never’s,’ and four ‘not’s.’ The 
prevalence of negation suggests that this poem is not a definition, but rather 
a rebuttal‑and all rebuttals encapsulate the argument they refute. As we can 
deduce the prior utterance being rebutted, (made, it seems reasonable to assert, 
by the young man), it has gone roughly as follows:
‘You would like the marriage of minds to have the 
same permanence as the sacramental marriage of 
bodies. But this is unreasonable; there are impediments 
to such constancy. After all, persons alter; and when 
one finds alteration one is himself bound to alter as 
well; and also, people leave, and one’s love is bound to 
remove itself when one’s lover removes. I did love you 
once; but you have altered, and so there is a consequent 
natural alteration in me. ‘
It is the iambic prosody that first brings the pressure of rhetorical refutation 
into Shakespeare’s line: ‘Let me not to the marriage of true minds / Admit 
impediments.’ Shakespeare says these lines schematically, mimicking, as in 
reported discourse, his interlocutor’s original iron laws of expediency in 
human intercourse: ‘To find alteration is to alter; to see a removal is to remove.’ 
(This law is, on the part of the young man, a self‑exculpating move; we see 
in it a grim parody of the laws of true reciprocity proposed throughout the 
sonnets.) And yet we are struck by the dreadful plausibility of the young man’s 
laws: they read like laws of mathematics. Alter the left side of the equation, you 
will alter the right; remove X from the left, and of course it must vanish from 
the right. Alteration causes altering; removers cause removing.
On the other hand, it is not very clear what the young man has had in mind 
in framing his laws: what is all this vague talk of altering and removing? Of 
course one who argues as the young man does has something specific in mind, 
but prefers to cloud it under large self‑excusing generalizations. And the one 
who disingenuously argues for ‘impediments’ must have some of his own in 
mental reserve.
Shakespeare’s first aesthetic technique in the sonnet has been to replicate the 
dishonest discourse of his interlocutor by mimicking it, even quoting it:
Let me not to the marriage of true minds 
Admit ‘impediments’: love is not love 
Which ‘alters when it alteration finds, ‘ 
And ‘bends with the remover to remove, ‘ 
O no!
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However, the speaker’s own denial, using the given schematic terms of his 
opponent, is unsatisfactory, because it simply accepts the terms (‘altering,’ 
‘removing,’) already established by the young man, giving them the lie direct. 
Shakespeare therefore makes his speaker move (in agreement with well‑
known oratorical principles) away from the negative refutation of an opponent 
to a positive refutation couched in new terms, apparently his own – ‘O no, it 
is [rather] X.’ The speaker leaves behind the as‑yet‑unclarified abstractions of 
vague ‘alterations’ and ‘removers’ in favour of his own emblematic North Star, 
a navigational fixed mark, but we can see that even that symbol has itself been 
conjured up by his opponent’s terms. ‘Alteration’ has engendered ‘ever fixed;’ 
and against the linear ‘remove,’ the speaker sets a circular ‘wandering’ that may 
err but cannot, thanks to the star, ever be permanently lost. Love, in terms of 
this positive refutation, is said to be able to look unshaken not only on those 
vaguely euphemized ‘alterations’ and ‘removes’ but on very tempests; and it 
does not fall within those grimly calculable materialist laws invoked by the 
young man; though it is describable, it is inestimable.
We now come, pursuing a reading for difference, to our re‑inscription. 
The third quatrain repeats, in briefer form, the rhetorical pattern of negative 
refutation followed by positive assertion which the preceding two quatrains 
had initiated. In this way, as rhetorical re‑inscription, this quatrain initiates our 
sense of the poem as repetitive‑as something that is reinscribing a structure (in 
this case one of negative refutation followed by positive refutation) which it 
has already used. The poem says yet again, ‘Love is not X, but rather Y.’ But the 
third quatrain is not simply a restating of those two threatening words ‘alter’ 
and ‘bend’ (so undefined in the young man’s utilitarian laws). The two words 
are now unpacked in their full significance as they are re‑inscribed in the 
poem, this time in emblematic form. The ‘remover’ who ‘bends’ turns out to be 
the grim reaper, Time, with his ‘bending’ sickle. What ‘alters’ are time’s ‘brief 
hours and weeks.’ (The indignant speaker will not dignify time with seasons 
and years, not to speak of epochs and ages; time, so important to the young 
man, is to be denigrated, to be denied all majesty and power.) Only the Day of 
Judgement (invoked from the sacramental liturgy of marriage) is the proper 
measure of love’s time. The speaker calls on St. Paul as witness that love bears 
all things. What then is this talk of removal?
The third quatrain had begun by keeping up the vehemence of refutation, 
remaining within the debater’s genre; but suddenly, a second concessive 
appears. Just as the speaker had conceded that the star’s height could be taken, 
so he now concedes that the young man is accurate on one point. Something 
in fact, it is true, is removed; something, it is granted, comes into the bending 
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compass of the sickle. The thing that the young man values, that he has in mind 
with his occluded talk of ‘alteration’ and ‘removes,’ turns out to be physical 
beauty, ‘rosy lips and cheeks.’ The speaker cannot deny the actual truth of those 
removals, but the concession is a painful one. The young man, even though 
concealing his motives behind his euphemizing vagueness, has been exposed 
(by this unpacking‑by‑reinscription of his very words) as a man in thrall to the 
sensual bloom of youth; when he sees the sickle bend, he must, he has said, 
bend with it, remove himself when he sees beauty removed, and find another 
as‑yet‑unreaped beauty.
Once Shakespeare has admitted the tragic law of the destruction of physical 
beauty by mortality, he cannot forget it. Love can now no longer be the 
superlunary fixed star contemplating from above even tempests unmoved; 
it becomes instead, in the second positive refutation, the human endurer, 
bearing it out, in the same horizontal plane in which life is lived, even to the 
edge of doom. In changing its mind about the proper description of love, this 
sonnet of re‑inscription, (wherein the early impediments cited by the vague 
young man are re‑summoned and made explicit in their specific reference to 
time and physical aging) also exhibits a self‑correction by its speaker; a love 
first described in transcendent vertical terms as a fixed star subsequently takes 
on the immanent horizontal form of stoic fidelity in endurance.
The couplet of this sonnet is at once a legal challenge in equity and a last 
refutation (and implicit condemnation) of the position of the young man. 
The young man has, after all, said, ‘I did love you once, but now impediments 
have arisen through alterations and removes.’ The speaker argues by means 
of the couplet that the performative speech‑act of Platonic fidelity in quasi‑
marital mental love cannot be qualified; if it is qualified it does not represent 
love. Therefore, if he himself is in error on the subject of what true love is, 
then no man has ever loved; certainly the young man (it is implied) has not 
loved, if he has not loved after the fashion urged by the speaker, without 
alteration, removals, or impediments. The poem entertains, in the couplet, the 
deconstructive notion of its own self‑dissolution; the impossibility of error is 
proved by the contrary‑to‑fact hypothesis, ‘I never writ.’ The triple negative 
here (‘Never, nor, no’) is the last signal of the refutational rhetoric of the poem, 
linking the couplet to all the ‘O no’s’, ‘never’s’ and ‘not’s’ that precede it.
I think it important that we see Shakespeare savagely clarifying, with his 
rewriting into pictorial emblematic form, the vague ‘alter’ and ‘bend’ of the 
disingenuous young man. But of course the hyperbolic, transcendent, and 
paradigmatic Petrarchan star is the casualty of the refutational réinscription 
contained in the third quatrain. The vertically‑conceived star cannot be 
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reinscribed in the matrix of the metonymic hours and weeks of linear sublunary 
mortality. Stars are not present at the edges of doom; the burdened pilgrimage 
to that utmost verge is human, stoic, and linear. The star lingers, semi‑effaced, 
a Petrarchan icon forsaken in favour of a Pauline love.
Without the differential model of refutation, re‑inscription, and self‑
correction, Sonnet 116 is imperfectly seen; we cannot judge its representational 
aim. No reader, to my knowledge, has seen ‘Let me not to the marriage of true 
minds’ as a coherent refutation of the implied argument of an opponent, and 
this represents an astonishing history of critical blindness, a paradigmatic case 
of how a reading which treats a poem as though it were an essay governed 
by an initial topic sentence can miss its entire aesthetic dynamic. Because 
many readers still seek, in the anxiety of reading, a reassuring similarity of 
parts rather than a perplexing difference, and prefer to think of poetry as a 
discursive propositional statement rather than as a motivated speech‑act, 
we are condemned to a static view of any given sonnet. It is as useful to ask 
of each sonnet what form of speech‑act it performs as to ask what aesthetic 
problems generated the poem as their exfoliated display; but these are not 
the same question, though they are often related. Here, the speech‑act we call 
refutation could equally well, for instance, have been carried out entirely in 
the first person, as it is in the following sonnet (‘Accuse me thus’). To discuss 
the aesthetic problems set by Shakespeare in writing the sonnet, we must ask 
the reason in decorum first for the use of the impersonal definition‑form 
governing the middle ten lines; and next for the necessity of doubling the 
definition‑form, so as to offer negative as well as positive ones; and thirdly, 
why the negative‑positive arrangement had to be done twice, so as to make 
two negative and two positive refutations in lieu of one of each. There are 
various answers to these problems: I am concerned only that they should be 
named as problems. We can perhaps see the indecorum of insisting entirely in 
the first‑person singular on the superior worth of one’s own fashion of loving 
(though Shakespeare resorts to that move in the couplet); but the problem of 
the two refutations doubled is a more interesting one, as is the necessity for the 
re‑inscription (as I have called it) of the young man’s vague words ‘alter’ and 
‘bend’ in the full clarity of their exposure as they are given, in the person of the 
Grim Reaper, emblematic form.
The chilling impersonality of the hideous implied ‘law of alteration and 
removal’ gives a clue to the sort of language used by the young man which is 
here being refuted, just as Shakespeare’s first refutational metaphor, the star‑
metaphor of transcendent worth, establishes another form of diction wholly 
opposed to the young man’s sordid algebraic diction of proportional alteration. 
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The second refutational passage, in the third quatrain, proposes indirectly a 
valuable alternative law, one approved by Shakespeare, which we may label 
‘the law of inverse constancy’: the more inconstant are time’s alterations (one 
an hour, one a week), the more constant is love’s endurance, even to the edge 
of doom. The impersonal phraseology of law, at first a euphemistic screen 
for the young man’s infidelity, is triumphantly but tragically modified by the 
speaker into the law of constancy in trial. That is, the emblematic reinscription 
(reusing ‘alters’ and ‘bending,’ adapted from ‘alters,’ ‘alteration,’ and ‘bends’), 
not only brings out the significance latent in these euphemistically disguising 
words, but also (by proposing a different ‘universal’ law) reinscribes with new 
significance the very structural form (an invariant law) of the young man’s 
objections. The model which I call ‘re‑inscription,’ then, consists here of a first 
negative‑and‑positive refutation of a message about alteration and bending 
inscribed in the implied form of a self‑serving law, and a second negative‑and‑
positive refutation of a message about alteration and bending, the refutation 
inscribed in the form of a constancy‑law. We can now see why the transcendent 
metaphorical star alone could not refute the young man: he had to be refuted 
in his own temporal and metonymic terms, as the identical form of the re‑
inscribed message indicates.
The sketch I have been offering of some Shakespearean aesthetic strategies 
– strategies of grammar and syntax, imitations of speech‑acts like refutation, 
imitations of the genres of definition or rebuttal, self‑correction, re‑inscription 
– helps, I hope, to present the sonnets as far more interesting because each one 
seems to propose for itself a well‑defined aesthetic problem of representation 
and inner evolution. The extreme local ingenuity of the sonnets (brought to 
our attention by Empson and Jakobson and Booth) should not blind us to how 
well that embellishing ingenuity is bent to the realizing of the emotional and 
aesthetic dynamic of the evolving poem. Our delight in the verbal play of these 
poems has sometimes led us to describe their ornament only as ornament, 
without referring it to the drive towards the problematizing of form present 
always in Shakespeare.
In presenting these models, I cannot fail to mention the epistemological 
effect of being exposed to the representation of successive differing mental 
perspectives. We have seen them, embodied apentimenti, offer themselves 
with equal brilliance and persuasiveness; or, as re‑inscription, bring to light 
(by re‑inscribing a position in identical but newly‑exposed language) covert 
meanings previously concealed in a euphemizing diction. These models – of 
self‑correction and re‑inscription – as I see them, argue implicitly against any 
‘natural’ reality extrinsic to the mind’s conceiving. Language, as we know it, 
18
Hilda M. Hulme Lectures 
can be arranged into successive models of reality; and although Shakespeare 
does not affirm the equal value of all models, he does imply that different 
subjects, and different motives, and even different moments in the same 
subject, engender new models in constant self‑replacement, each one either 
correcting, repudiating, or elucidating an earlier one. Though this may be 
the final epistemological implication of these models, it is not their ultimate 
interest for Shakespeare. He needs to see how mental states can be convincingly 
represented in language, and how their evolution can be enacted in a formal 
dynamic: when he has brought that about, he rests, satisfied.
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